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Balkan Politicians, Mostly Immune to the 
Influence of EU Integration 
 
SIMEON MITROPOLITSKI 
 
 
Are the post-communist politicians changing their political identities as a 
result of European Union (EU) integration? Are they more likely to accept 
democratic norms and procedures as their countries are moving toward EU 
membership?  
The literature gives two mutually excluding answers with possible shades 
of gray between them. On the one hand, Vachudova and Spendzharova1, 
Levitsky and Way2, Pridham3, Hullen and Borzel4, share the optimistic vision of 
EU integration as beneficiary to democratic development in post-communist 
context, including also its role in promoting democratic political culture, in 
shifting political calculations toward accepting western norms, and in teaching 
local political elites the rules of democratic bargaining. As an alternative, 
authors such as Gallagher5, Raik6 and Bideleux7 tell a different story. EU 
                                                          
1 
 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration 
After Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; Aneta B. Spendzharova, 
Milada Anna Vachudova, “Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria 
and Romania after EU Accession”, West European Politics, vol. 35, no. 1, 2012, pp. 39-
58; Milada Anna Vachudova, “EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles 
of Enlargement Ten Years On”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 122-
138. 
2
  Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, “Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide”, 
East European Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2007, pp. 48-66. 
3 
 Geoffrey PRIDHAM, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in 
Post-Communist Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York, 2005. 
4 
 Vera van Hullen, Tanja Borzel, “The EU’s Governance Transfer. From External 
Promotion to Internal Protection?”, SFB Governance Working Paper Series, no. 56, 2013. 
5 
 Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic 
Reform, and the Theft of a Nation, New York University Press, New York, 2005. 
6 
 Kristi Raik, “EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and 
Integration as Conflicting Logics”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18, no. 4, 
2004, pp. 567-594. 
7 
 Robert Bideleux, “Europeanization and the Limits of democratization in East-Central 
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conditionality may produce effects contrary to democratic expectations. 
Populist elites may also use European democratic image to promote their selfish 
political agenda. Thirdly, Coman and Crespy8 find scholars who minimize the 
overall influence of EU integration in post-communist political development9. 
Finally, Sedelmeier argues10 that EU pro-democratic influence over political 
actors in post-communist countries varies across issues and countries and that it 
might require a demanding constellation of favorable conditions for both social 
and material pressure. 
This paper aims to settle down/address this dispute by bringing up the 
evolution of some key political decision makers in two post-communist 
countries, Bulgaria and Macedonia. Methodologically, it produces short 
analytical narratives on seven Bulgarian and four Macedonian politicians. These 
politicians, however, do not live in isolation. They are physical but also 
symbolic centers of groups of followers who maintain their discourse 
communities through intense communication. Therefore the information is 
evaluated in the light of these discourse communities, the traces of ideas that are 
present in the larger society. These traces were collected through field research 
in Bulgaria and Macedonia between 2009 and 2011. In terms of organization, 
the paper is divided into sections that tell the story of post-communist political 
development in both countries, followed by biographical narratives for each 
politician, followed by discussion of findings. 
Findings for both countries represent a collection of different statements 
that are part of third-party interviews, media reports, and official party sites. 
The study narrates political events that are part of these top politicians’ 
biographies. These statements were published for the most part in Bulgarian and 
Macedonian; the fact that Bulgarian was my mother tongue and Macedonian 
was very close to Bulgarian was of help to understand the messages on a 
semantic level; on a pragmatic level, the interviews that I made with ordinary 
                                                                                                                                              
Europe”, in Geoffrey Pridham, Attila Agh (eds.), Prospects for Democratic Consolidation 
in East-Central Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001, pp. 25-53. 
8 
 Ramona Coman, Amandine Crespy, “A Critical Assessment of the Concept of 
Europeanization in Light of the State of the Union”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political 
Science Review, vol. XIV, no. 1, 2014, pp. 9-28. 
9 
 Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media 
Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; Yves 
Meny, Pierre Muller, Jean-Louis Quermonne, Adjusting to Europe: the Impact of the 
European Union on National Institutions and Policies, Routledge, London, 1996; Rosa S. 
Salgado, Cornelia Woll, L'Europe en action: l'européanisation dans une perspective compareé, 
l'Harmattan, Paris, 2007. 
10
  Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and 
Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 52, no. 1, pp.105-121.  
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Bulgarians and Macedonians were helpful to further interpret the political 
message in a particular social context. 
Regarding the choice of politicians, seven for Bulgaria and four for 
Macedonia, at first, I decided to follow the evolution of the political identities of 
those who represented only authoritarian positions, former communist or 
populist. It made sense because if EU influence had to be found, these 
politicians would be the ideal group of initially reluctant but afterward 
accepting new European norms of behavior. Later on, after the first set of 
interviews with ordinary people in Bulgaria in 2009, I came to the conclusion 
that this approach of sample building was incomplete; it could not identify the 
opposite trend, politicians who became less democratic and more authoritarian, 
or more populist, alongside or despite or maybe because of the process of 
European integration. This goal not to miss and to account for as many as 
possible political culture trajectories explained why I included politicians for 
both Bulgaria and Macedonia who entered and remained in the politics 
representing, at least initially, democratic and pro-European positions. 
The choice of the politicians had to meet certain criteria. They had to be 
as long as possible within active politics throughout the entire post-communist 
period (1989-2011). They had to occupy key decision-making positions, such as 
heads of state, heads of government, or “gray cardinals”. They had to enjoy 
significant popular support for at least part of the post-communist period. Some 
very interesting politicians from both countries were eliminated from the sample 
because their sudden death made difficult if not impossible for me to speculate 
on their possible political trajectories if they had survived until 2011; thus I 
eliminated the former Bulgarian Prime Minister Andrej Lukanov, a key figure 
in Bulgarian post-communist political transition, who was killed in 1996 and 
the Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski who died in a plane crash in 2004. 
Another potentially interesting politician from Macedonia, Ali Ahmeti, the 
leader of the ethnic Albanian party The Democratic Union for Integration, was 
eliminated from the sample because he represented a confirmed case of 
schizophrenia; in this case I could not filter out the influence of the EU from his 
mental condition. 
 
 
BULGARIA 
 
In Bulgaria, the very beginning of the post-communist transition was 
heavily marked by the political domination of the ideological heirs of the 
Communist party: they won the first competitive election in 1990. The first 
political transition occurred in 1991 following a parliamentary election. The 
parliamentary elections in 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2014 were 
won by parties and coalitions in opposition to the incumbent government. The 
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president of the republic, elected by popular vote, is largely a ceremonial figure. 
The presidential elections have been won by either incumbents (2007) or 
challengers (1997 and 2002). Aside from the first post-communist year of 
political transition, when the country was marked as an “intermediary” political 
regime, Bulgaria has always been considered a “free” political regime by 
Freedom House’s annual assessment11. Bulgaria is an interesting case as a 
principal subject for this study as it became an EU member state not too long 
ago, in January 2007. In addition, this country defies the simplistic logic of 
institutional transfer from West to East. Even after its formal EU membership, 
Bulgaria continues to incite serious questions regarding the quality of its democracy12. 
 
 
Alexander Lilov (1933-2013) 
 
Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and of the State 
Council in the 1970s and 1980s. Leader of the Socialist, former Communist, 
Party in 1990-1991. Known in the party circles as the “strategist”. From 1993 
led the Party’s Center for Strategic research. PhD. Worked on philosophy of art, 
ideological struggles, and international relations. Among his most recent works 
were: The dialogues of civilizations (2004) and Informational epoch (2006). 
Despite the lack of formal positions in the state, there was a consensus among 
his political friends and enemies that he was still among the top decision-
makers in the Socialist Party. He was credited with having imposed the idea of 
unity at all costs within the party despite the calls for separation of the communist 
and social-democratic wings at the beginning of the post-communist transition. 
An overview of some recent writings and interviews of Lilov showed that 
he remained a communist believer as far as the final goal of social development 
was concerned. He stated that there was a new form of society developing 
beyond the industrial and the capitalist form of production, and also beyond the 
soviet type of socialism13. As a true Marxist, he believed that this new society 
would come forward following objective laws of history, and as such it was 
historically inevitable. Talking about Bulgaria within the large European Union, 
Lilov was a utilitarianist: the European Union was just an economic tool for 
Bulgaria to overcome its technological backwardness through foreign 
investments that could not be accumulated fast through internal sources. 
Nowhere Lilov spoke about national identity shifts toward more European 
                                                          
11
  FREEDOM HOUSE, Nations in Transition, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/, 
accessed 16 October 2014. 
12
  Venelin Ganev, Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria After 1989, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2007. 
13 
 TEMA WEEKLY, http://www.temanews.com/index.php?p=tema&iid=333&aid=8066, 
accessed 16 October 2014. 
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elements whether descriptive or normative. The nation-state for him remained 
historically and conceptually the best level of analysis. Lilov did not consider 
European liberal democracy as the only possible for Bulgaria or even as the best 
form of political regime, although he acknowledged that it might have some 
benefits over the Soviet political regime14 (Blog.bg, 2009). Nevertheless Lilov 
defended the need for authoritarian leaders, akin to the Machiavellian princes of 
virtù, to push ahead Bulgaria on the fast track of the post-industrial 
informational society15. To summarize Lilov’s political positions, he did not 
change significantly toward a more procedural and egalitarian political culture. 
He remained deeply entrenched within the communist teleology; he believed 
that a perfect social world beyond politics was not only possible but also 
historically inevitable. European Union membership was just the way to 
accelerate the path of history in Bulgaria and therefore it was desirable. The 
ultimate goal of civilization, however, lied beyond the EU itself. Comparing the 
ideas of Lilov with the set of Bulgarian interviews, I could safely say that there 
was a good match between them and those who still believed in communism. 
They were also people of certain age, 70 and over. For them, post-communist 
transition was no more than a strategic retreat or a temporary accommodation 
before further political and social mobilization that aimed to build a 
communism. There was not even a talk about accepting the new procedural 
rules as fundamentally fair, or, using Lilov’s words, there was no acceptance of 
the “end of history”.  
 
 
Georgi Parvanov (b. 1957) 
 
President of the republic since 2002 and reelected for the second term 
that started in 2007. Former leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (1996-2001). 
In early 1997 he was largely credited with preserving the social and political 
peace in the country by refusing, on behalf of his party, at that time with an 
absolute majority in the Parliament, to accept a new mandate to form a 
government. In mid-2009 he was credited with the idea of electoral law 
amendments that introduced mixed proportional-single district systems instead 
of the existing simple proportional system. Doctor in history (1988); his 
scientific interests lied with the history of the socialist and communist 
movement in Bulgaria as well as with the Bulgarian national movement. 
Between 1992 and 1996 he was director of the Center for historical and political 
studies of the Socialist party. Up to the late 1990s, as a leader of the Socialist 
                                                          
14 
 BLOG.BG, http://gerbsenior.blog.bg/politika/2009/01/31/aleksandyr-lilovinterviu.284436, 
accessed 16 October 2014. 
15
  TEMA WEEKLY, cit. 
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party, he strongly suggested to take into account the negative Russian position 
on NATO and EU enlargements.  
Unlike Lilov, Parvanov was not a communist believer. For him the real 
social world, the world to be improved, was the world we lived in. The 
European Union was mainly a tool for economic and technological 
modernization, and a guarantor for the peaceful development of the continent, 
in general, and of the Balkan region, in particular. The EU, according to 
Parvanov, influenced the candidate countries either with the direct effects of 
institutional diffusion or by changing the expectations of the local political 
elites and general populations. Some statements, however, showed that he was 
far from uncritical regarding European discourses in different areas. Taking 
collective security as an example, Parvanov remained “realist” by inviting 
Russia to be a more active player in the Balkans alongside Europe and the 
United States in what he described as regional balance of forces. Another way 
of using the EU for domestic political purposes was his idea of increasing the 
relative power of the president and reducing the relative power of the parties. 
The imperatives of adopting European norms, according to Parvanov, clashed 
with the existence of hundreds of parties, which promoted selfish economic 
interests. The presidential institution, on the other hand, according to him, was 
the most republican institution in the country, thus more adapted for 
coordinating the economic and technological development. We could better 
understand these ideas for institutional change with the special personal 
relations between Parvanov and the Russian president Vladimir Putin and his 
projects of establishing a “power vertical”. There would be no space here to 
explain the reasons why, unlike Bulgaria, the presidential “coup” in Russia 
became possible in the early 2000s. It suffices to say that Parvanov was among 
the chief architects of the electoral law amendment in 2009, only weeks before 
the general election that tried to change the rules in order to reproduce the same 
parliamentary majority. This showed that Parvanov was not ready to play by the 
rules, and that he used the EU symbolically as an excuse for his attempts to 
change the rules of the political game. It was hard to find some analogies of this 
behavior with any other Bulgarian informant in the interviews. Another 
example of playing at the border if not outside frame of rules was Parvanov’s 
decision to back the new citizens’ political movement in late 2010 that 
presented candidates to the Parliament elections in 2014. According to the 
Bulgarian constitution, Parvanov at the time of his presidency was not allowed to 
have party affiliations; the constitutionality of such moves was therefore questionable. 
 
 
Zhan Videnov (b. 1959) 
 
He was a nomenclature cadre of the Communist youth organization in the 
late 1980s. He was the leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (1991-1996) as a 
political and ideological heir of Alexander Lilov. Bulgarian Prime Minister in 
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1995-1997. He stepped down following hyperinflation, social protests and calls 
for resignation from inside the Socialist party. Left the Socialist party executive 
in 2000; left the party by 2009. He was part of radical socialists’ groups for 
discussions, not happy with the official party policy and the general political 
direction of the country. He taught courses on European integration at the 
European College of Economics and Management in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. 
Zhan Videnov was a radical socialist; yet words such as “communism”, 
“revolution” were not part of his everyday vocabulary. Instead, he preferred 
using negative qualifications, to attack the rich and most powerful, the mafia, 
oligarchs, and firm directors16. Ideologically he was close to Lilov. Videnov 
was against the separation of powers and against the courts’ independence from 
the political executive. The state for him was a machine that did not like having 
more than one head. This also explained why he was against the office of 
president that interfered with governmental policy17; according to Bulgarian 
Constitution the office of president was largely a ceremonial figure. For 
Videnov the art of politics was technocracy, deprived of feelings and subjective 
dimensions of any sort. This was what he saw in the European Union and 
European integration, an opportunity for attaining better technocracy and social 
management. This technocracy was value neutral; it might be used for different 
political projects, including radical leftist. There was no independent civil 
society in his political project; even the media had to be mobilized in order to 
reveal the enemies of the people. The state had to be kept economically and 
financially as independent as possible from foreign interests, western as well as 
eastern. For Videnov, electoral procedures came always second to the will of 
people, which, undisturbed, had always to give power in the hands of 
progressive parties. If not, this was always a result of lack of political principles, 
such as being ready to form strategic electoral and post-electoral coalitions 
without other purpose than taking and remaining in power. Like Lilov, Videnov 
had sympathizers among some older leftist citizens. As a technocrat, he was also 
close to some interviewees within the Bulgarian civil service; they reflected the 
vision of the state as unitary and independent actor from the private social interests. 
 
 
Ivan Kostov (b. 1949) 
 
He was an economist who supported Marxist ideology even after the start 
of post-communist transition in 1989. In 1990 he entered active politics and ran 
for a member of Parliament under the banner of the united anti-communist 
                                                          
16
  VESTI.BG, http://www.vesti.bg/?tid=40&oid=2749391, accessed 16 October 2014. 
17 
 DNEVNIK DAILY, http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/06/10/915180_jan_videnov_ 
prezidentut_triabva_da_ima_samo/, accessed 16 October 2014. 
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opposition. In 1991 he was nominated as minister of finance. In 1994 he was 
elected as chairman of the anti-communist coalition, Union of democratic 
forces; he was reelected in early 1997. In 1997, he won the general election and 
became Prime Minister. From this time on he was also known in the party 
circles as the “commander”. His government strongly pursued the EU and 
NATO integration goals. He lost the election in 2001 and stepped down as a 
party leader. In 2004 he created a new center-right party, Democrats for strong 
Bulgaria, which helped him enter the Parliament in 2005 and again in 2009, 
although his influence was currently marginal. He stepped down from party 
leadership in 2013 when his party remained outside the Parliament. Because of 
his physical appearance many Bulgarians, usually opposing Kostov’s polices, 
called him “mangal”, which is a pejorative word for a dark-skinned gypsy. 
Ivan Kostov was a conservative politician; he advocated a free market 
economy with some social protection, defending Christian moral values, and a 
strong foreign policy orientation to the West, EU and NATO combined. He was 
also a strong advocate of a United Europe of nations with the possibility, but 
only if necessary, of some supranational institutions such as the common 
European currency. Throughout the 1990s and up to the end of his term in 
office as a Prime Minister European integration, always together with Euro-
Atlantic integration, was a “civilizing” project, a Bulgarian choice for 
modernity, free markets, liberal democracy, and human rights18. In that sense he 
strongly opposed the perceptions that Bulgaria was destined to remain outside 
the Western sphere of influence. EU membership was instrumental in bringing 
Bulgaria into the West. By changing the main foreign vector, from Russia 
toward Europe and the United States, Kostov changed domestic power relations 
from balanced and even tilting toward Moscow at the beginning of post-
communist transition to predominantly pro-western at the end of the 1990s. In 
order to please the EU, he was ready to make big concessions such as closing 
four nuclear reactors that Brussels considered dangerous19. When in opposition, 
Kostov nevertheless advocated the Bulgarian agenda in Brussels. After 
becoming a EU member, Kostov tried to block Turkey’s membership because 
of the violations of democratic norms and human rights; he also strongly 
opposed the right to vote among some ethnic Turks, born in Bulgaria, who lived 
permanently in Turkey since the mass expulsion in 1989. Kostov easily found 
close matches with some interviewees as far as European integration was 
concerned. These were mainly older citizens who opposed the Russian 
influence in Bulgaria, open anti-communists, and financially independent 
persons thanks to the real estate restitution policy of Kostov’s government in 
                                                          
18
  BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT, http://sun450.government.bg/old/bg/prime_minister/ 
statements/2000/02_11_Otchet_NS.htm, accessed 16 October 2014. 
19
  KAPITAL WEEKLY, http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/1999/10/30/ 
252797_zatvariame_starite_blokove_na_aec_kozlodui/, accessed 16 October 2014. 
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the late 1990s. Compared to the other Bulgarian politicians within this sample, 
Kostov “spoke” better European language; this language, however, had been 
learned before the European integration of Bulgaria officially started. 
Chronologically, Kostov had made his “civilization” choice much before 
Brussels started the integration talks; and this was for strategic reasons linked to 
the distribution of political forces within and outside the country. In 2010 the 
EU remained for Kostov only a tool, material and symbolic, for clearing the 
internal political landscape of uncivilized and uncivilizing enemies, found 
mainly in the Socialist party but also in the Turkish ethnic Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms. 
  
 
Simeon of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha  
(Simeon Sakskoburggotski) (b .1937) 
 
Born as heir to the royal family in Bulgaria, he was forced into exile in 
1946 following referendum establishing a republican form of government. In 
April 2001 he called for creation of political movement bearing his name, the 
National Movement Simeon II, to take part in the forthcoming general election. 
He won the election with a landslide and became Bulgarian Prime Minister 
(2001-2005). During his mandate Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004. He lost the 
general election of 2005, but his party took part in the new government coalition 
(2005-2009). His party did not enter the Parliament following the 2009 general 
election. Simeon of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha immediately stepped down from 
the party leadership. As political refugee he never renounced his claims to be a 
head of state. As a Prime Minister, in 2001, he took oath to protect the 
republican constitution. 
Among Bulgarian politicians, Simeon was in a class of his own, being 
most of his life a political refugee, mostly in Spain, and also being a close or 
distant cousin to most European royal families. This gave him the unique 
opportunity to feel himself “European” long before most Bulgarians did; in 
other words, he did not need to prove his Europeanness or change identity in 
order to become European. Unlike most Bulgarians that still perceived Europe 
as “over there”, since 2007 he openly spoke of Brussels as “we”20. His principal 
political agenda when he entered Bulgarian politics was the restoration of the 
monarchy or at least putting under question the legitimacy of the republic as 
form of government. With the passing of time, his monarchic ambitions 
vanished and the role of a Prime Minister so far remained the pinnacle of his 
political carrier. Initially reluctant about strongly pushing ahead with the EU 
                                                          
20
  BLOG.BG, http://meto76.blog.bg/politika/2010/04/25/negovo-velichestvosimeonsakskob 
urggotski-chlenstvoto-ni-v-.534361, accessed 16 October 2014. 
SIMEON MITROPOLITSKI 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIV  no. 4  2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
506
and NATO agenda, he gradually accepted the already predominant social and 
political opinion and built his political legitimacy as a strong advocate of both 
international institutions. Outside of power he used the EU as an institutional 
tool for pursuing his private interests21. Feeling both Bulgarian and European, 
Simeon could easily switch allegiance because there was no line separating both 
identities. In that sense his opinions were very close to some expressed by the 
interviewees who used the EU in order to solve their private problems and thus 
being comfortable of becoming de-nationalized.  
 
 
Volen Siderov (b. 1956) 
 
He entered active politics as editor-in-chief of the main opposition daily 
newspaper Demokracija in 1990-1992 and later as deputy editor-in-chief of 
daily newspaper Monitor. He studied theology. His political views were laid 
down in literary writings The Boomerang of the evil; The Power of the 
Mammon; The Bulgarophobia that were published in the early 2000s. In brief, 
he considered the international Jewish-led conspiracy and freemasonry as 
driving forces for modern Bulgarian political development; they aimed at 
genocide and enslavement of Christian Orthodox nations, forcing upon them 
wars and cataclysms in order to make them financially dependent. He tried 
briefly to work as political partner for the Bulgarian Socialist Party in the mid-
1990s and unsuccessfully ran for a candidate of the Simeon Saxe-Coburg and 
Gotha movement in 2001. He ran, unsuccessfully, for Sofia mayor in 2003. In 
2005 his newly-registered party Ataka, named after his popular TV talk show, 
the National Union Attack, finished in 4th place in the general election with 8% 
of the votes. He lost the presidential election in 2006 against the incumbent 
president Georgi Parvanov. His party maintained its electoral strength during 
the general election of 2009. 
Siderov opposed European integration as a form of suppression of the 
Bulgarian nation. He advocated a strong Bulgarian state and the assimilation of 
the ethnic minorities through education. Every Bulgarian government before 
and especially after the beginning of the post-communist transition represented 
mafia interests that aimed at the theft and destruction of the Bulgarian nation. 
The EU was a form of surrendering national sovereignty; the possible entry of 
Turkey into the EU would signal the beginning of a new Turkish (Ottoman) 
yoke in Bulgaria. The EU was ruled by special interests, by politicians who 
stole as much as their Bulgarian counterparts. The more integrated Bulgaria 
became within the EU, the more radical the ideas of Siderov became. This 
                                                          
21
  DIR.BG NEWS, http://dnes.dir.bg/news/simeon-saxkoburggotski-mincho-spasov-
tzarskite-imoti-6835957, accessed 16 October 2014. 
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radicalism paradoxically appeared less radical given the even greater 
radicalization of the mainstream politicians against the migrants in some EU 
member states. Despite his anti-European vocabulary, Siderov’s speeches 
showed the acceptance of Europe as political “normality” that he used in order 
to measure up the Bulgarian, and other, political and social developments22. 
When necessary, he was ready to invoke some European principles, such as the 
free movements of people, in order to defend his positions. His positions and 
political trajectory easily found analogues throughout the general population. 
 
 
Ahmed Dogan (b. 1954) 
 
He took part in underground political activity against the forced change 
of names of the ethnic Turks in the late 1980s. Arrested in 1987; condemned to 
10 years of imprisonment for creating an anti-state organization. He fell under 
amnesty law and was liberated in the late 1989. PhD. Founding father of the 
party Movement for Rights and Freedoms in 1990, also known as the Turkish 
ethnic party, and its leader until 2013. Under his leadership, his party supported 
the governments in 1991-1992 and in 1992-1994 and took part in the 
governmental coalitions in 2001-2005 and in 2005-2009. 
Dogan presented his party as part of an alternative political and ethnic 
model of inclusion in the Balkans in the 1990s, the other alternative model 
being the ethnic populism based on ethnic exclusion and oppression, e.g. the 
Milosevic’s regime in Serbia. The European Union was used instrumentally by 
Dogan throughout the 1990s as a “normality” representing ethnic tolerance as 
opposed to the Balkanization. Political support in Parliament was offered as an 
exchange for presenting Bulgaria as being up to the European democratic 
standards, and his party was presented as a guarantor for political stability and 
ethnic peace, given the strong and irreconcilable opposition between the 
Communist party successor and the anti-communist political pole. With the EU 
membership being mission accomplished in 2007, Dogan realized that the 
ethnic populism that was kept under control was about to blow up, and that his 
party would inevitably become the center of attacks of the Bulgarian ethnic 
majority23. Being again in opposition, without natural political allies, made 
difficult the task of surviving through building larger coalitions. The EU could 
not be used directly anymore as a tool for influencing the Bulgarian policy 
because EU membership made Bulgaria relatively immune to critiques 
                                                          
22 
 Political party ATAKA, http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=5102&Itemid=91, accessed 16 October 2014.  
23
  BLOG.BG, http://reporter.blog.bg/novini/2009/12/13/dokladyt-na-dogan.453865, 
accessed 16 October 2014.  
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regarding the composition of government. That was why Dogan tried to 
influence directly the European Union by manipulating its original idea of union 
of democratic values instead of just economic union or of Christian political 
club. By trying to shift the core European identity toward more ethnic and 
religious inclusiveness Dogan hoped to see Turkey inside the Union, and by 
turning it into multicultural project, to “normalize” his political position within 
the Bulgarian political landscape. Thus, for Dogan, European integration was 
not just a means of directly changing his position within Bulgarian politics or 
changing the priorities of public policies, it was also a new opportunity for dialogue 
with Brussels that represented two-way political road of mutual influence. 
 
 
MACEDONIA 
 
In the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, from the 
beginning of the post-communist period until the end of the 1990s, Kiro 
Gligorov, a former high-ranking communist official, dominated the political 
executive as president of the republic. The first political transition occurred in 
1998 and 1999: a large political coalition, led by Ljubco Georgievski, won both 
the parliamentary and the presidential election. Political transitions also 
occurred after the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2006, and after the 
presidential election in 2004 and 2009. During the post-communist period, 
Freedom House (2014) has considered Macedonia as “intermediary” political 
regime. Macedonia, which is a candidate for EU membership, is still in the 
conditionality “waiting room,” pending the official start of accession 
negotiations. For comparative analytical purposes, Macedonia is a good 
candidate for a study alongside Bulgaria.  
 
 
Kiro Gligorov (b. 1917-2012) 
 
He was a member of the anti-fascist resistance movement during the 
World War II and an active participant in the political creation of the People’s 
Republic of Macedonia after the war. He was a member of the Yugoslav federal 
government in the 1960s and president of the federal assembly, the parliament, 
during the 1970s, and also a member of the collective presidency of Yugoslavia. 
After the establishment of pluralistic democracy he was elected twice as 
president of Macedonia (1991-1999). Severely wounded during a bomb 
explosion in 1995; he lost one arm and remained blinded with one eye. After his 
terms in office accomplished, Gligorov wrote books; he also created a 
foundation bearing his name for cultural projects. He was an important member 
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of the Balkan Political Club, a club of former Balkan heads of states and heads 
of governments that aimed at contributing to the regional peace and prosperity.  
Gligorov was largely perceived as a pro-Serbian politician despite his 
claims of being equally distanced politically toward Macedonia’s four 
neighbors during his terms in office in the 1990s; these neighbors being Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. He was the political architect of the first post-
independence Constitution24 and of the referendum for independence of 
September 1991. The referendum, that officially proclaims independence, in 
fact opened the possibility to renew political links with the other Yugoslav 
republics within a new union. This aspect of the referendum question should not 
be forgotten given the real situation in September 1991, when Yugoslavia did 
not have functioning federal institutions, the Slovenian ten-days war was over 
and the war between Serbia and Croatia had already begun. Despite the slow 
process of European integration during the 1990s, Gligorov was its strong 
advocate as an alternative to the ethnic enclosures and the creation of Slav or 
Christian Orthodox axes. Despite his European optimism, he did not accept 
European leadership without question25. In that respect, he shared the same 
opinion with many Macedonians who did not accept one-size-fits-all type of 
solutions coming from Brussels. Gligorov, being optimist as far as EU 
integration was concerned as a distant goal, remained pessimist regarding its 
short-term prospective. That was why he suggested other intermediate forms of 
integration that stimulate regional cooperation. This key element might suggest 
that Gligorov saw European integration through the prism of the former 
economic ties with the other former Yugoslav republics, a quite common 
opinion in Macedonia.  
 
 
Branko Crvenkovski (b. 1962) 
 
 He entered the politics at the first multiparty elections in Macedonia as 
part of Yugoslavia (1990). A former communist, Crvenkovski presided over the 
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, the SDSM, since 1991, except for the 
time of his presidential term in office. He was a Prime Minister of Macedonia 
after independence from 1992 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2004. As a Prime 
Minister, he officially applied for EU membership. From 1998 to 2002 he was 
the leader of the opposition in Parliament. Elected president of the republic for 
one term between 2004 and 2009. Known for his controversial decision in 1996 
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 MACEDONIA GOVERNMENT, http://makedonija.name/government/constitution-of-
macedonia, accessed 16 October 2014. 
25 
 UTRINSKI VESNIK DAILY, http://www.ex-yupress.com/mkutvesnik/mkut esnik8.html, 
accessed 16 October 2014. 
SIMEON MITROPOLITSKI 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIV  no. 4  2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
510
to remove all Albanian flags in front of governmental buildings in the areas 
where the Albanian minority represented the majority of the population; in 
2005, as a president, he made a political U-turn by legalizing the Albanian flags.  
 Regarding the “name dispute” with Greece, which by extension was a 
dispute with the EU, Crvenkovski insisted on finding a solution that would be 
satisfactory to both sides26. As a president he frequently expressed the view that 
Macedonia should live by European norms and not vice versa, thus accepting 
the asymmetrical power relation between Skopje and Brussels. By doing so, he 
put in jeopardy his political future, given the strong opposition within 
Macedonian society on this issue. With nationalist propaganda playing in favor 
of his political enemies, now in power, the answer Crvenkovski was giving was 
to embrace the EU stand at any political cost even if that includes asking for 
change of the republic’s name, even in case of a real conflict of interests 
between Macedonia and Brussels, thus leaving the nationalist field even more in 
the hands of his political enemies. Crvenkovski’s views were shared by some 
ethnic Macedonians, and by most minorities in the country. The tough question 
was to understand the real influence of the EU on this ideological evolution; 
whether the EU was not just another name for asking for creation of new 
Yugoslavia when all former Yugoslav republics joined the EU. My tentative 
answer so far would be affirmative, the EU really was a way to sell again the 
Yugoslav idea; the proof was the change of the EU integration issue from 
marginal in the 1990s when Crvenkovski was a Prime Minister to top priority in 
the 2000s, when he was a president. In the 1990s an eventual rapprochement 
with the EU would have distanced Macedonia from most other former Yugoslav 
republics in the midst of military conflict. Once the wars ended and Milosevic 
was removed from power in Serbia, the possibility of all former Yugoslav 
republics entering the EU became real, thus explaining the more active and pro-
European polity of Skopje.   
  
 
Lubcho (Lupcho) Georgievski (b. 1966) 
 
 Leader of the Party VMRO-DPMNE from its inception in 1990 to 2003. 
The first vice-premier of Macedonia after its independence in 1991. Leader of 
the opposition in parliament until 1998 and a Premier between 1998 and 2002. 
Removed from the party leadership in 2003 he created a new party with 
marginal influence. While Premier, he presided over the military confrontation 
between Albanian armed separatists and the police in 2001; the conflict ended 
after the EU provided diplomatic aide. After the conflict, he suggested the 
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  MACEDONIAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY, http://macedoniaonline.eu/ 
content/ view/15218/45/, accessed 16 October 2014. 
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creation of ethnically pure nations on the Balkans, through population 
exchange, in order to eliminate the risks of new ethnic conflicts; he kept this 
idea unchanged throughout the years ahead27 (Frog News, 2007). This 
suggestion was universally condemned, thus probably contributing to his 
demise as a party leader in 2003. In 2006 he received Bulgarian citizenship; this 
decision was severely criticized in his country and he gradually left Macedonian 
political life. 
Georgievski declared himself a “bulgarophile”, which in the context of 
Macedonia was a code word meaning either feeling ethnically linked to 
Bulgarians or feeling to be of Bulgarian origin. This position made him 
automatically an anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav politician. Accordingly, his 
attitudes toward possible EU integration followed the ups and downs of the 
Serbian chances for euro-integration. He was more enthusiastic toward EU 
integration when Milosevic was in power in Belgrade and EU integration would 
mean distancing Macedonia from Serbia; in the early 2000s, however, he 
proposed his anti-European plan of creating pure ethnic states. This anti-
European turn explained why Georgievski complained about the agreement to 
end the ethnic conflict in 2001 as being imposed under the pressure coming 
from the EU and the United States28. By deduction, I would suggest that the 
conflict of 2001 itself was a way of ethnically dividing the country, mainly 
between the ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian minority with possible 
subsequent exchange of population. Regarding the “name dispute” with Greece, 
he advocated finding a compromise respecting the asymmetrical power relations 
with the EU. The reason for accepting this time the EU diktat might have lied in 
the strategic calculation to destabilize the ethnic identity of the country through 
imposing a new name, thus making the Macedonians more acceptant of the idea 
of their Bulgarian origin; only such a radical switch in national identity could 
guarantee that he reentered Macedonian political life as a mainstream politician. 
The idea of an ethnically divided Macedonia was not popular even among the 
ethnic minorities who preferred EU integration as a way of solving their 
national aspirations to live without borders. For him the EU was either a tool or 
an excuse, never a new supranational identity.  
 
 
Nikola Gruevski (b. 1970) 
 
His family originated from the territory of Greece. He was an economist; 
his economic ideas developed in the mid-1990s and did not change ever since. 
He challenged the liberal dogma of the benefits of foreign investment for fast 
economic development. He was minister of finance in the VMRO-DPMNE 
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  FROGNEWS.BG, http://frognews.bg/news_996/Liubcho_Georgievski_Velika_Albaniia_ 
shte_spasi_Makedoniia/, accessed 16 October 2014. 
28
  FROGNEWS.BG, cit. 
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government between 1998 and 2002. After the EU-brokered peace agreement in 
2001 and the electoral defeat in 2002 he presided over the pro-EU faction 
within the party, ousting the former leader Georgievski and becoming himself 
party leader. He won the parliamentary election in 2006; he got another term in 
office with a landslide victory in 2008 after failing to secure an invitation for 
NATO membership; he won again the elections in 2011 and 2014. He was the 
political architect of the Skopje-2014 projet; a huge by the local standards 
public investment that started in 2008 aiming to change the image of the capital 
city center by adding ancient-style buildings, structures, and monuments.  
 Gruevski advocated finding a compromise with Greece over the name 
of the republic29. He however did not accept that Greece picks the name or 
circle of names to choose from. He considered the EU not as unified entity, but 
as an international organization within which there were many, often 
conflicting, interests; he tried to isolate Greece within the EU in order to change 
the balance of forces in Macedonia’s favor. His perception of the EU reflected 
his vision of Europe as a community of relatively independent nations; a 
community within which the real decision-makers were and would always be 
the national governments. Within such a Europe, Macedonia had to remain 
relatively independent and relatively economically self-sufficient, which 
corresponded to his economic vision. For him the EU influence, which was by 
its very nature heterogenous, far from imposing the idea of inevitability of the 
membership, of the asymetrical power relations, of the EU diktat, made him 
politically more active in order to rebalance these relations, by looking for 
strong allies within the EU30. Instead of complaining, like Georgievski, about 
the EU diktat, Gruevski affirmed his independence vis-à-vis the EU by trying to 
isolate Greece within the union; the strong popular support among the main 
ethnic group in Macedonia made him even more confident that his stand of 
defiance was politically sustainable.  
It went without saying that his views were supported by many ethnic 
Macedonians. Unlike Gligorov and Crvenkovski who interpreted the EU as a 
tool of renewying the links between the former Yugoslav states, and 
Georgievski who saw the EU as a possible tool for “Bulgarization”, Gruevski 
entered a dialogue of defience with Brussels to foster a separate Macedonian 
identity. The asymetrical power relation between the EU and Macedonia, 
therefore, instead of bringing Macedonia closer to Brussels, made the country 
more independent and sefl-confident. 
                                                          
29
  TURKEY AND MACEDONIA NEWSLETTER, http://turkeymacedonia.wordpress. 
com/tag/nikola-gruevski/, accessed 16 October 2014. 
30
  Most countries in the world, including many EU members recognized Macedonia under 
its constitutional name. Personally, I observed that in the EU offices in Skopje the local 
political maps had names reading “Republic of Macedonia” instead of “Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”.  
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COMPARING BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA 
 
Bulgaria and Macedonia are on two different stages of European 
integration, which partly explains the differences in both countries between the 
developments of a new European identity. Some top Bulgarian politicians 
already develop such a new, more complex identity: Kostov, Simeon II, 
Siderov, and Dogan; there is, however, no such trend among the top 
Macedonian politicians. Interesting fact, none among the Bulgarian former 
communist leaders within the sample: Lilov, Parvanov, and Videnov, develops 
supplemental European identity; as it turns out, which may be the possible 
explanation for this fact, their political sub-culture is very resistant against 
western ideological indoctrination. They remain either communist believers, 
such as Lilov and Videnov, or use the EU only as an instrument for personal 
political ambitions, such as Parvanov. As far as European integration is 
concerned, the Bulgarian non-communist politicians are more likely to be 
influenced by it. Among them, however, Kostov is a peculiar case; he is under 
EU influence only if we enlarge the definition of EU integration well beyond 
the period of formal accession negotiations. He embarked on the EU train 
before the train was put together; as if he made the right calculation long in 
advance and adjusted his earlier positions, which were of being a Marxist 
economist, to fit the imperatives of the future world, neo-liberal and neo-
conservative. Simeon II had fully adopted the European perspective to the point 
of using the EU institutions for personal interests. He too, however, had 
developed this new identity long before the EU integration by any definition; in 
a sense that he was European as early if not much earlier as being Bulgarian. I 
would point at the two remaining Bulgarian cases as most interesting for my 
research; Siderov and Dogan developed new European identities as EU 
integration went on. They felt part of a larger political landscape where their 
different political luggage, extreme right or liberal, could find storage space. 
They felt influenced directly by the processes within this larger landscape. But 
they were not just reacting to events that were orchestrated elsewhere. They 
both focused their policy on redefining the core meaning of being European, 
exclusively Christian for Siderov or inclusively multicultural for Dogan. They 
both looked at moving toward the political center and to a dominant position 
within domestic and supranational politics by rearticulating the main principles 
Europe was standing on. It seems that such approach is not trademark of 
Bulgarian politicians who represent ethnic minority interests. Dembinska31 
(2009) reports similar development in other new EU countries, such as Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania.   
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  Magdalena Dembinska, “L’appropriation de l’Europe par les minorités: une 
instrumentalisation bénigne”, in Amandine Crespy, Mathieu Petithomme (eds.), L'Europe 
sous tensions. Appropriation et contestation de l'intégration européenne, l'Harmattan, 
Paris, 2009, pp. 239-260. 
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There was no corresponding new European identity under development 
among the Macedonian top political decision makers. Two of them, Gligorov 
and Crvenkovski, used the EU only as a politically correct tool for 
reestablishing close links with the former Yugoslav republics with a possible 
hidden agenda of reestablishing close links with Serbia in particular. Close to 
this group as a way of using the EU as a tool, but with the idea of moving 
Macedonia closer to Bulgaria was Georgievski. Only Gruevski was in fact 
strengthening the local national identity by redefining the power relations with 
the EU, a union that in his view was rather a community of heterogeneous 
interests than a supranational union speaking with one voice. Ironically, 
Gruevski was the only Macedonian politician who changed under the influence 
of EU integration, but in quite different direction from that of the EU’s formal 
intentions, by becoming less pro-European and more nationalistic.  
 The stronger influence of the EU in Bulgaria, even as a tool for personal 
political ambitions, was reflected in the fact that some Bulgarian politicians, all 
within the communist spectrum, could use it in order to change the rules of the 
political game in order to remain in power, e.g. Parvanov. This paradox could 
be explained by the fact that although the EU was perceived as influential by the 
population, the politicians, as relatively more autonomous in their decisions, 
could use this new symbolic actor in order to change the political agenda, in the 
name of EU integration of course. In Macedonia, where the country did not see 
the EU as such a powerful domestic player yet, the local politicians, even if they 
contemplated unconstitutional political changes, e.g. Georgievski’s idea of pure 
ethnical division of the country, they could not use the EU as a main excuse.  
 To summarize, most politicians, both Bulgarian and Macedonian, are 
relatively immune to the influence of EU integration in the sense of identity 
change; most of them remain and some, like Gruevski, move even more toward 
nationally-based identity, looking at the EU only as a tool for serving their 
short- or long-term political domestic agenda. Some politicians in Bulgaria, 
such as Siderov and especially Dogan, however, along with the instrumental 
vision of the EU, have also developed a new complex European identity 
allowing them to look at the political world differently, not only to fully accept 
liberal democracy’s rules, but also to act simultaneously on different levels, 
national and supranational. This is not a simple reproduction of the institutional 
logic that follows the EU integration of Bulgaria. These two top politicians, 
especially Dogan who represented the Turkish minority, are not simple agents 
that follow the imposed rules and norms from Brussels in exchange for 
protecting their own political and social or ethnic interests. On the contrary, 
they are relatively free actors who try to influence the source of their new 
identity. They not only apply the norms without question, but also, and this 
applies especially to Dogan, try to enter a new form of dialogue that has a 
potential of changing the nature of EU integration by changing the nature of the 
EU itself.  
